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1. INTRODUCTION
********************
PRC Speas, assisted by David R. Bornemann Associates, Inc., has conducted
analyses of flight plan data for the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration-Lewis Research Center under Contract #NAS3-22748.
The objective of these analyses was to assess the potential improvement
in fuel savings which may be possible from improved meteorological
data. Flight plans calculated from prescribed input parameters and
meteorological data sets were used as quantitative indicators of differ-
ences in fuel burn and other relevant parameters. Flight plan data
were provided through the cooperation of two airlines which will be
referred to as "BLUE Airline" and "RED Airline" throughout this report
in order to maintain anonymity.
The work program under this contract was divided into four tasks. This
volume of the final report presents the findings of Task I which involved
various comparisons of flight plans which were calculated on operational
National Weather Service forecasts with similar flight plans based upon
the verifying analyses.
None of the analyses in Task I used flight plans that were calculated in
real time for actual flights. All of the plans were recreated, after
the fact, on either the BLUE Airlines or RED Airlines computer flight
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planning systems. NASA recreated, or simulated, actual flights by
submitting sets of meteorological data and flight plan inputs to BLUE
and RED based on both computer-generated and actual flights. The flight
plan inputs included standard values for such parameters as payload,
cruise speed, aircraft type, and altitude profile so that, to the
extent possible, the effect of these variables was eliminated and
differences between flight plans could be attributed to differences in
the meteorological data.
The major findings and conclusions under Task I are presented in the next
section. This is followed by sections on the analysis methodology and
the extent and validity of the data. Subsequent sections fully describe
Task I and present the findings in detail.
2. SUMMARY AND KEY FINDINGS
********************************
Task I compared fuel burn, flight time, air miles and ground miles on
flight plans that were based on the U.S. National Weather Service (NWS)
forecasts with corresponding plans based on the NWS verifying analysis to
determine the' fuel savings that were possible through improved weather
forecasts. The comparisons involved flight plans that were produced on
the RED and BLUE Airlines flight planning systems. Key findings were:
Comparisons, between B747 flight plans on operational routes (which
were probably not minimum fuel tracks) based on the NWS forecast and
plans on the same routes based on the verifying analysis showed
that fuel savings per flight for 8747 aircraft would average 462 kg
(151 gal.) if the forecasts and verifying analyses were identical.
Different savings of comparable order of magnitude would result in
other regions of the world.
If, in addition to the improved forecasts, operational constraints
imposed by the NAT track system on the use of minimum time tracks
and optimum flight levels were removed the average potential savings
per flight increases to 1394 kg (458 gal.).
Airlines whose track selection methodology is based on minimum time
rather than minimum fuel, and airlines that select a preliminary
minimum time track at a constant flight level before optimizing the
flight level, do not select the optimum fuel NAT track 45 to 50
percent of the time.
Comparisons of track selections between Amsterdam and Caracas on a
single fixed route that had been used by one airline, and on eight
other routes laid out by NASA, showed that the original route was
optimum only six times out of 60 cases. The average fuel burn
penalty for being on this route was 1054 kg (347 gal.) per flight.
In Task I, NASA provided PRC Speas with approximately 20,000 flight plans
that had been computed on either the BLUE or RED flight planning systems
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using weather data for various days in 1979. These plans consisted of
five categories:
• Flight plans on minimum time/minimum fuel tracks at optimum flight
levels between various North Atlantic and North Pacific city-pairs;
• Flight plans on "AIDS recreated routes" which are operational routes
that were actually flown on that day by aircraft equipped with an
Aircraft Integrated Data System (AIDS) that collects wind and
temperature data on board and stores them on magnetic tape for
subsequent processing on the ground;
• Plans on minimum time tracks at five fixed flight levels on various
North Atlantic routes;
• Plans between Amsterdam and New York on tracks in the North Atlantic
Organized Track System;
• Plans on nine fixed routes between Amsterdam and Caracas.
:
 Computer programs were developed to analyze these data and produce
statistics on the differences in fuel burn, flight time, air miles and
ground miles between various groups of plans such as AIDS flights vs.
the corresponding minimum time track, or the minimum time track on
the forecast weather vs. the minimum time track on the actual. In
every case, the flight plans used the National Weather Service (NWS)
operational forecast and verifying analysis. .The plans based on the
verifying analysis represent the actual weather as depicted by the NWS on
the analysis valid at that time and are not necessarily representative of
the actual weather encountered by that flight.
Several features inherent in the BLUE system, the NWS analysis model, and
NASA's input procedures caused some anomalies in the data base. Three of
these were somewhat significant.
First, an error checking procedure on the valid times of observations in
the NWS software caused pilot reports and AIDS data submitted by NASA
to be ignored, and resulted in the verifying weather analyses being
always identical to the forecasts in equatorial regions and the Southern
Hemisphere. As a result data from some flights in these regions had to
be discarded.
Second, AIDS recreated flights in the BLUE system used direct, great
circle routes between the origin and the oceanic entry point while the
minimum time track plans were restricted to airways. This resulted in a
distance bias generally favoring the AIDS flights which sometimes gave a
fictitious indication of fuel savings when AIDS flights were compared to
minimum time tracks.
Third, since NASA's inputs to the BLUE system tried as closely as
possible to recreate the original conditions under which AIDS flights
operated, flight levels were restricted to those used by the AIDS flight
while minimum time track plans were calculated at optimum levels. This
resulted in fuel burn differences which were attributed to the flight
level difference rather than weather data differences.
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Adjustments based on manual analysis were made to the computer output to
correct the findings for these anomalous data. The adjustment factors
were developed from a detailed analysis of actual flight level and
distance differences in the BLUE flight plans.
Five comparisons were conducted between different flight plan groups, a
sixth case considered track selection procedures on the North Atlantic,
and a seventh case considered the penalty associated with the use of a
fixed route between Europe and the Caribbean. A summary of the findings
from each of these cases is presented below.
Case 1 - The first case compared AIDS flights planned on the forecast
weather to AIDS flights planned on the verifying analysis. Since all
other flight plan parameters (route, flight level, etc.) were held
r
constant, differences between the flight plans reflected differences
between the weather data sets and, in this case, the potential fuel
savings that would result if the forecast were improved to the point at
which it was equal to the verifying analysis.
The number of flight plan comparisons in the sample and the average
differences (forecast plan value minus analysis plan value) in fuel burn
were:
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BLUE System Flight Plans
All eastbound flights
North Atlantic eastbound flights
All westbound flights
North Atlantic westbound flights
Sample
Size
222
109
305
143
Burn
Difference
369 kg
569 kg
-140 kg
-295 kg
RED System Flight Plans
All eastbound flights
All westbound flights
Sample
Size
95
147
Burn
Difference
, 384 kg
-371 kg
The positive differences eastbound, and negative differences westbound
indicated that wind speeds are generally underestimated in the NWS
forecast model.
Case 2 - Case 2 compared minimum time tracks based on the forecast to
minimum time tracks based on the verifying analysis and, as such, was.
quite similar to Case 1 except for the use of different routes. The
objective was to determine the potential fuel savings that would result
if the forecast were equal to the verifying analysis and if carriers
could use random tracks.
The number of comparisons in the sample and the average differences in
fuel burn in this case were:
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BLUE System Flight Plans
All eastbound
North Atlantic eastbound
All westbound
North Atlantic westbound
Sample
Size
229
199
231
202
Burn
Difference
739 kg
815 kg
-409 kg
-322 kg
RED System Flight Plans
All eastbound
All westbound
Sample
Size
29
29
Burn
Difference
475 kg
-324 kg
Case 3 - Case 3 compared AIDS recreated flights on the forecast weather
to the corresponding minimum time track on the forecast weather. The
objective was to show the potential fuel savings that could result if
carriers were free to fly the minimum time track.
Based on the raw data the sample sizes and the average differences or
savings in fuel burn were:
BLUE System Flight Plans
Eclstbound-North Atlantic
Westbound North Atlantic
Sample
Size
36
49
Burn
Difference
-511 kg
1978 kg
RED System Flight Plans
Eastbound North Atlantic
Westbound North Atlantic
Sample
Size
7
10
Burn
Difference
1892 kg
1760 kg
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Since this case compared AIDS flights to minimum time tracks, the
BLUE data were distorted due to the direct routings and flight level
differences. Estimates of the effect of these routing and flight level
differences were computed and the estimated BLUE differences after these
adjustments were applied were:
Eastbound
Westbound
1061 kg
1397 kg
Case 4 - Case 4 was identical to Case 3 except that both the AIDS flights
and minimum time tracks were based on the verifying analysis.
Fuel burn differences using the raw data were:
BLUE System Flight Plans
Eastbound North Atlantic
Westbound North Atlantic
Sample
Size
35
48
Burn
Difference
666 kg
2096 kg
RED System Flight Plans
Eastbound North Atlantic
Westbound North Atlantic
Sample
Size
7
10
Burn
Difference
1931 kg
1937 kg
After applying an adjustment for the routing and flight level differ-
ences, the BLUE savings were:
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Eastbound
Westbound
1216 kg
1515 kg
Case 5 - Case 5 combined the conditions of Cases 3 and 4 and compared
AIDS flights on the forecast weather to minimum time track flights on the
verifying analysis. The objective was to show the combined savings from
improved forecasts and from eliminating ATC restrictions on the use of
the minimum time track.
Again, based on the raw data alone, the potential savings were:
BLUE System Flight Plans
Eastbound North Atlantic
Westbound North. Atlantic
Sample
Size
36
49
Burn
Difference
1311 kg
1594 kg
RED System Flight Plans
Eastbound North Atlantic
Westbound North Atlantic
Sample
Size
6
10
Burn
Difference
1989 kg
1220 kg
Applying the adjustment -to--the BLUE data results in savings of:
Eastbound 1861 kg
Westbound 1013 kg
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North Atlantic Track Selection
Analysis of flight plans run on each of the North Atlantic Organized
Tracks at each available flight level on each of 30 days in both direc-
tions tested three hypotheses, each of which is followed by some airlines
and is incorporated in their track selection algorithms.
1) On 40 out of 84 "days" (30 eastbound and 30 westbound for BLUE, and
16 eastbound and 8 westbound for RED) the minimum time track was not
coincident with the minimum fuel track. Thus, airlines whose track
selection is based on time rather than fuel are on the wrong track
45 percent of the time.
2) In 28 out of 60 cases the minimum time track selected at FL330 or
FL350 was not the minimum fuel track at optimum altitude. This
indicates that airlines that select a preliminary minimum time track
at a constant flight level and then optimize for fuel in the flight
plan are on the wrong track 47 percent of the time and incur an
average fuel burn penalty of 248 kg each time they are on the wrong
track.
3) In 19 out of 60 cases the minimum fuel track on the actual was not
the same track as the minimum fuel track on the forecast. This is
contrary to the beViefs of many carriers who feel that the weather
changes so slowly that the best track does not change between the
forecast and the actual even though the time and fuel burn on that
track might change.
SPEAS
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3. DISCUSSION OF DATA
**************************
All of the flight plans that were used in the Task I analyses were based
upon weather data and operating conditions that actually existed on
selected days during 1979. A global weather experiment was being
conducted at that time and, as a result, significantly more observational
data were available and routinely input to the U.S. National Weather
Service (NWS) forecast and analysis models.
A number of Boeing B747 and McDonnell Douglas DC-10 aircraft of several
international airlines were equipped with an Aircraft Integrated Data
System (AIDS) during the study period. AIDS automatically collected on
board the aircraft and stored on magnetic tape readings of position,
altitude, temperature, wind velocity and time. These AIDS data were used
directly in Task III. However, in Task I the AIDS data were only used to
identify operational flight routes that were used in the comparisons.
The remainder of this section of the report discusses the weather data
and the flight plan data produced by the BLUE and RED flight planning
systems.
3.1 WEATHER DATA
All of the weather data used in Task I were from either an operational
NWS forecast (the Nine Level Primitive Equation Model used by the NWS in
1979) or from the verifying analysis valid at the time of that forecast
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(the Flattery Analysis Model). Although this verifying analysis is
sometimes referred to as the "actual analysis" or "actual weather"
throughout this report, it should be understood that it is the actual
weather as represented by the Flattery analysis and is not necessarily
the same as the actual weather observed by AIDS equipped aircraft on that
day. These data are routinely produced by the NWS and the forecast is
translated into digital form and transmitted to airlines for use in
flight planning. For those days included in this study the NWS produced
a copy of the 18-hour and 24-hour forecasts and the corresponding
verifying analyses (as appropriate) on magnetic tape for subsequent use
by NASA in recreating flight plans for that day.
The NWS forecast model that was operational at the time these data were
gathered was essentially a northern hemispheric model. For latitudes
below approximately 20°N and the Southern Hemisphere the present analysis
was issued as a forecast. NASA submitted extensive AIDS data and pilot
reports to the NWS to enhance the accuracy of the NWS analyses for this
study. It was not known at that time, but the NWS analysis program in
checking the valid times of the additional observations discarded all
of the NASA supplied .data in these southern areas. This caused the
"forecast" and the verifying analysis to be identical in these southern
latitudes. Thus, flight plans for flights in these regions showed no
difference between the forecast and the actual.
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Data normally are provided to the airlines in digital form, the so-called
Aviation Digital Forecast, in a Marsden Square format and are transmitted
over high speed teletype lines to airline users. Wind and temperature
data are included for various levels including the 300 mb., 250 mb., 200
mb., and 150 mb. levels which were of most interest in this study. In
addition, the height of the tropopause is identified. Each Marsden
Square is ten degrees of longitude by ten degrees of latitude and data
are included for sub-square points within each Marsden Square. The
density of the sub-squares varies with latitude. At mid-latitudes the
sub-square points are separated by 2-1/2 degrees lat i tude and f ive
degrees longitude. Thus, data points in this critical area are about 150
to 250 nm. apart.
The density of the Marsden Square data points introduces a potential
error in the flight planning process that wi l l be addressed in the
next section of this volume. Most airlines have developed their own
algorithms for interpolation between sub-square points to determine the
wind factor to be used for a flight plan segment. As a result the
same forecast issued by the NWS to all airlines is likely to result in
different segment wind forecasts by the time the forecast appears in
individual flight plans.
The NWS analysis and forecast cycle repeats twice daily. The analysis
times are OOOOZ and 1200Z. Based upon the worldwide observation data
input to the analysis at these times, forecasts of 12, 18, 24 and 30
SPEAS
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hours are computed and offered to the airlines. For this project NASA
used the 18 and 24 hour forecasts following the procedure utilized by
most airlines.
3.2 FLIGHT PLAN DATA
The flight plans used in all of the Task I analyses were generated either
by the BLUE or RED flight planning systems. NASA provided these airlines
with copies of the appropriate Aviation Digital Forecast Data on magnetic
tape along with flight plan requests that were reconstructed from the
operating conditions in effect on that day, such as the North Atlantic
Organized Tracks (NAT Tracks). By providing the forecast and verifying
analysis data, it was possible to simulate flight plans that might have
been calculated on that day even though they were actually being rerun
sometime later.
Although the routes and altitudes used were those flown by actual AIDS
equipped aircraft, it is important to note, as mentioned earlier, that in
Task I no comparisons were made with the actual fuel burn results of
these flights. All of the analyses involve simulations of flights as
represented by flight plans. In most cases no flight actually operated
according to this plan on that day and there is no certainty that, had
such a flight operated, its actual flight time and fuel burn would have
been equal to that calculated on either a flight plan based upon the
forecast or on a plan based on' the verifying analysis.
pTC SPEAS
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3.2.1 BLUE Flight Plans
Input options in the BLUE flight planning system allow for specification
and control of the weather forecast data, the payload, cruise speed, fuel
reserves, altitude profile and route. For the Task I analyses each of
these parameters was held constant, to the extent possible, so that
differences between flight plans on the forecast and flight plans on the
verifying analysis could be attributed entirely to differences in the
weather data. (For some of the analyses the routes were varied while the
same weather data set was used.)
NASA submitted up to 760 flight plan requests to BLUE for each day on
which data were collected. (A total of 30 days were included in the Task
I comparisons. Two days were from January and the remainder were
days from the months of August through November.) For each "flight"
considered a plan was run on the 18-hour or 24-hour forecast weather and
another was run on the appropriate verifying analysis for that day.
Therefore, up to 380 flights were considered for each day. The actual
number varied because such things as the number of NAT Tracks varied and
the number of AIDS equipped flights varied.
The flight plans run on the BLUE system consisted of five categories.
These were:
• Minimum time tracks (MTTs) at optimum flight levels between various
city-pairs normally served by BLUE or the other airlines that use
,CPC SPEAS
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the BLUE flight planning system. Most of these were North Atlantic
flights but one each day was for a Pacific operation between Tokyo
and Seattle.
• "AIDS recreated flights" or flight plans using BLUE aircraft input
parameters but on routes that were actually flown on that day by
some AIDS equipped aircraft of BLUE or the other airlines that use
the BLUE system. Flights in all regions of the world were included
in this group.
• Minimum time tracks at five fixed flight levels between Amsterdam
and New York. These plans were run in each direction at flight
levels 290, 310, 330, 350 and 370 (eastbound) or 390 (westbound).
• North Atlantic organized tracks between Amsterdam and New York,
and between Madrid and New York. A flight plan was run at each
available flight level (except FL390) on each track, in each
direction.
• Amsterdam-Caracas tracks. Flight plans were run at five levels, in
both directions, on nine fixed routings between Amsterdam and
Caracas, one of which was the route routinely used for actual
flights between these cities.
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The weather data for each day were submitted by NASA on magnetic tape
and simulated a real time transmission of the Aviation Digital Forecast
Data. The NASA flight plan requests then specified the forecast valid
time that was to be used on that plan.
Each plan was identified by a NASA flight number to assist in identifying
certain categories of flights, such as MTT flights or NAT Track flights,
in the subsequent analyses but also to de-identify airlines which may
have actually operated a similar flight on that day. Since SLUE provides
flight plans to several other airlines and since the routings for some of
the flights in this analysis were recreated from actual AIDS flights,
this de-identification was deemed to be necessary.
All flight plans run on the BLUE system used either the 8747 or DC-10
performance data and were flown at standard cruise which, in the BLUE
system,, is Mach .84 for 8747s and Mach .83 for DC-10s. (In fact, except
for one flight plan each day that was run on the MTT selected by the
Gander, Newfoundland, Oceanic Control Center, all BLUE plans were based
on B747 aircraft.)
NASA initially attempted to calculate all flight plans from a constant
zero fuel weight (ZFW) of 195,000 kg and all plans at optimum flight
levels were based on this ZFW. However, for some of the comparisons at
fixed flight levels the 8747s at this ZFW were too heavy to reach the
pPC SPEAS
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specified level. All of the fixed level comparisons were then run from a
ZFW of 165,000 kg.
Although a constant value was used for alternate fuel, reserve fuel which
is partly a function of trip length varied slightly. Therefore, the
landing weights for all flight plans were close but not exactly equal.
Several methods were available to specify the desired route on the
BLUE flight plans. Pre-stored. fixed routings could be identified by a
track number, MTT routings could be requested by identifying the origin
and destination, and any other route could be input by identifying the
check points that comprise the route. When the MTT was requested the
computer restricted the selection to operationally feasible routes. That
is the route was restricted to airways in areas where airways exist and
to appropriate intersections of latitude and longitude off-airways or
over the ocean such as on the North Atlantic where flights are restricted
to whole degrees of latitude at ten degree longitude crossings. When the
route was specified in the input the flight plan was based upon a direct
great circle routing between each of the input checkpoints.
3.2.1.1 Error Sources
Although keeping the input parameters of cruise, zero fuel weight, etc.
constant should have minimized errors, some errors were introduced by the
inherent features of the flight planning system. Time and fuel burn
comparisons were distorted to some degree by inconsistencies in the
PC SPEAS
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weights, flight levels, or routings between the flight plans being
compared. The effect and magnitude of these errors on the overall
analysis are discussed below and in more detail, with the findings in
Section 5.
Since the gross weight of an aircraft at any moment is a principal factor
affecting fuel consumption, it is essential that the weights of two
aircraft be identical if one is to use fuel consumption as an indicator
of the relative efficiency of one flight plan or route over another.
Since the choice of route or other flight parameters affects the length
of the flight, and thus the fuel consumption and gross weight, it is not
possible for two aircraft to be at the same weight throughout their
flight unless they are on the same route, same flight level, same weather
data, same speed and started at the same time and weight. Because of the
slight variations in reserve fuel, these flight plan calculations started
at different landing weights even though the payload or zero fuel weight
was held constant. As the segment by segment calculations proceeded
along the flight plan route the weight differences became larger as the
route, wind or temperature varied.
The differences in landing weight resulting from reserve fuel differences
are very small - typically from zero to 100 kg. These would not signif-
icantly affect the overall analysis. Some of the enroute differences
grow to significant amounts, however, and one must consider that in
some of the flight plan comparisons a portion of the fuel "savings" or
.,
;
 ' ',•' SPEAS
21.
"penalty" is the result of weight differences rather than improved
meteorological data.
Just as weight affects fuel consumption, so does altitude. Substantial
fuel savings can result from higher altitude operations. Therefore, in
general if one is using flight plan fuel consumption as an indicator of
the relative effectiveness of two different weather data sets the flights
must be planned at the same altitudes. For some of the flight plans
calculated at optimum altitude, weight differences, route differences or
operational considerations inherent in the BLUE flight planning system,
such as the requirement that step climbs be made only at checkpoints,
resulted in plans being calculated at flight levels that differed from
the levels on the plans with which they were compared.
Finally, routing differences introduced a significant error in some of
the analyses. At the time the data for this project were being collected
NASA believed that the most significant results in the North Atlantic
area would be found in comparisons of the over ocean portions of flight
plans and concentrated on identifying the over water portions of the
routes. The computer's default selection was accepted for the over-land
portion. As a result, MTT routings used airways routings to the ocean
while plans on the NAT Tracks or those on routings recreated from
AIDS flights used more direct routes from the origin to the first ocean
checkpoint and from the last ocean checkpoint to the destination. On a
flight from New York, for example, where the airways routing from JFK to
SPEAS
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YYT to 43N50W is approximately 1,125 nm. the direct routing is 1,107 nm.
The airways distance from Houston to Goose Bay to 56N SOW is 2,495 nm.
while the direct distance is 2,460 nm.
3.2.2 RED Flight Plans
The procedures for producing flight plans on the RED system were essen-
tially similar to those for BLUE. Input options allowed for specification
of the payload, cruise speed, fuel reserves, altitude profile and route.
The RED track selection system selects on the basis of minimum fuel
rather than minimum time. Where "minimum time track" is mentioned in
the following discussion "minimum fuel track" (MFT) is implied if the
reference is to a track selected on the RED system.
NASA submitted an average of 160 flight plan requests per day covering 80
"flights" for each day on which data were collected.
RED data were collected for 29 days during the same time period as the
BLUE data but not necessarily on the same days. There are a few days for
which there are RED data but no BLUE data and there are days on which
there are only BLUE data, but in most cases data were collected by both
airlines on the same day.
Unlike BLUE, the RED flight planning system is not used by other airlines
that were involved in this project. Thus, the plans included in the
analyses represent a smaller number of flights and are restricted to the
SPEAS
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geographic areas in which RED normally operates. The flight plans run on
the RED system corresponded to the categories of BLUE flight plans except
for the Amsterdam-Caracas category which was not included in the RED
analysis. The RED categories were:
• MTTs/MFTs at optimum flight levels between New York and London;
• "AIDS recreated flights" on North Atlantic and Polar routes actually
flown on that day by AIDS equipped RED aircraft;
• MTTs/MFTs at fixed flight levels between New York and London, New
York and Rome, New York and Paris, New York and Madrid and between
Chicago and Amsterdam;
t NAT Tracks between Amsterdam and New York, at each available flight
level, on each track and in both directions.
All of the RED flight plans used 8747 performance data, Mach .84 cruise
and were based upon a ZFW 193,000 kg. Again, as in the BLUE case, for
flight plans run at specified fixed flight levels the ZFW was reduced
to 163,000 kg to insure that the specified altitude could be reached.
There is a significant difference between the two flight planning systems
in that the RED system always used an operationally feasible route. When
a direct route was requested, for example, from the origin to the first
SPEAS
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ocean check point, the RED system would 'select an airways routing rather
than the great circle route. Therefore, the RED flight plan comparisons
were not subject to this potential error in distance between AIDS
recreated plans and MTT plans. However, the RED comparisons were still
subject to the less significant errors resulting from weight and flight
level differences.
Although it does not affect comparisons between RED plans, there is
another significant difference between the systems that affects compar-
isons of BLUE plans with RED plans. RED uses a distinctly different
approach toward processing the weather data. Flight plans run on the
BLUE system were run on either the 18-hour or 24-hour forecasts provided
by NASA, whereas the RED system used both forecasts, interpolating
between them according to the departure time of the flight. Similarly,
each system uses a different approach for interpolating between Marsden
Square data points to arrive at wind components for flight plan segments.
In addition to this difference in weather data processing, the two
systems most certainly employ different algorithms for calculating
aircraft performance parameters such as altitude capability and fuel
consumption. As a result it is safe to say that, given the same input
data, the two systems would not produce exactly the same result.
This potential source of error has to be considered carefully in any
comparison involving both systems.
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4. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
****************************
The objective of the study as set forth by NASA required that specific
comparisons be made between categories or groups of flight plan types.
Four categories of flight plans were provided for the study:
(1) Operational flight plans based on forecast weather;
(2) Minimum time/minimum fuel plans based on forecast weather;
(3) Flight plans based on the verifying analysis;
(4) Minimum time/minimum fuel plans based on the verifying analysis.
Comparisons were made of flight plan parameters such as fuel burn and
flight time between groups 1 and 3; 2 and 4; 1 and 2; 3 and 4; and 1 and
4. The remainder of this section of the report describes briefly how
the raw data were reduced and the various analyses were made.
4.1 DATA REDUCTION
Since the normal means of delivery of flight plans to flight crews is via
teletype, both RED and BLUE output flight plans in a format compatible
with teletype transmission. The flight plans will include addresses,
message switching codes and line control characters. For this project,
the flight plans were copied on magnetic tape in this "teletype image"
format. Therefore, the first, and most tedious, task was to scan the
SPEAS
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tapes to extract and identify those data which were to be considered in
the analysis.
Computer programs were developed which extracted data, completed most of
the analyses automatically, and presented statistical results. Each
day's data for each airline were contained on one tape. Therefore, a
total of 59 tapes had to be reviewed to extract the data for some 30,000
flight plans.
Files were created to store pertinent data for further analyses as the
tapes were scanned. Figure 4-1 lists the file entries that were saved
for each flight plan and Figure 4-2 lists the file entries for each
flight plan segment. Most of these data were read directly from the
flight plan but several had to be derived, calculated or inferred from
the available data as discussed below.
Group Code - Each flight plan was assigned a code to identify to
which of the five categories (discussed in Section 3.2.1) it
belonged, such as "AIDS recreated" flight, or "Amsterdam-Caracas"
flight. This assignment could be determined only through knowledge
of the flight numbering system. For example, all BLUE Amsterdam-
i
Caracas flights were numbered 381 through 479, while all RED and
BLUE westbound NAT Track plans were numbered 1 through 60.
27.
Figure 4-1
DATA FILE ELEMENTS FOR FLIGHT TOTALS
Date
Origin Airport
Destination Airport
Group Code
Airline Code (BLUE or RED)
Fl ight Number
Weather Forecast Valid Time
Flight Time
Takeoff Weight
Landing Weight
Ground Distance
Wind Component
Fuel Burn
Altitudes
Run Code
Region
Direction
Nautical Air Miles
Ratio of Air Miles to Ground Miles
Sequence Number of File Entry
28.
Figure 4-2
DATA FILE ELEMENTS FOR FLIGHT SEGMENTS
Date
Origin Airport
Destination Airport
Flight Number
Airline Code
Weather Forecast Valid Time
Identification of From Point
Identification of To Point
Segment Flight Level
Segment Flight Time
Segment Fuel Burn
Segment Distance
Segment Wind Direction and Speed
Segment Outside Air Temperature
Run Code
Segment Nautical Air Miles
Region
Ratio of Air Miles to Ground Miles
Direction
Sequence Number
CPC SPEAS
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Component - While the wind component was presented directly on
RED plans, on BLUE plans it had to be determined from the wind
correction angle, ground speed and air speed.
Run Code - The run code was added to identify the flight plan as
one based upon the forecast or one based upon the actual weather.
There was no such identification printed anywhere on the flight
plan and this could be determined only from the sequence of the
plan on the tape. The plan on actual weather always followed
immediately its corresponding plan on the forecast. (This was a
potentially serious source of error since an out-of-sequence plan
could distort the results. However, subsequent checks on such items
as origin-destination and date during processing, and manual review
of the analysis results verified that there was little likelihood
that plans were assigned the wrong run code.)
Region and Direction - The region of the world and direction of
flight were identified by reference to a city-pair table which was
created specifically for this purpose. So, for example, KJFK-EGLL
(or New York-to London) was identified as an "ea's'tbduricT North
Atlantic flight while OMD8-EDDF (Dubai-Frankfurt) was classed as a
westbound Mid-East flight.
The regional categories that were included in the table, and a
general description of the area or flights that were included in
each region, were:
SPEAS
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• North Atlantic - flights between Europe and eastern North
America;
• Mid-Atlantic - flights between Europe and the Caribbean or
South America, or flights between the eastern U.S. and Africa;
• Pacific - flights between Japan and Anchorage or the U.S., and
those between Honolulu and California;
• Africa - flights within Africa or between Europe and Africa;
• Caribbean - flights within the Caribbean, Central America or
South America;
• Polar - flights between Anchorage or the U.S. West Coast and
Europe;
• Far East - flights within the area bounded by Japan, Australia
'and Southeast Asia;
• Europe - flights within Europe;
• United States - flights within the U.S.;
• Mid-East - any flights traversing the Mid-East to or from
Europe such as Frankfurt-Dubai or Frankfurt-Bangkok.
4.2 COMPARISONS BY FLIGHT
Having organized the data into the files just described, the required
analyses were then conducted by successive searches of the files keyed on
the particular categories or groups being compared. For example, for the
comparison of groups 1 and 3, the files were searched for all AIDS
recreated plans (which are identified by their group code) and, for those
which were found to match on date, origin, destination, airline and
flight number, the differences between the plan based on the forecast and
the plan based on the actual were extracted and accumulated. (Note that
no other parameters such as flight level, route or takeoff weight were
C SPEAS
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matched.) The forecast plan value minus the actual plan value was
saved for: fuel burn, flight time, air miles, ground miles, and the
ratio of air miles to ground miles. These values were printed for each
flight included in the analysis along with the mean difference, the
variance, standard deviation, 90 percent confidence limits and number
of occurrences. These data were printed in a format similar to the
sample in Figure 4-3 which includes a histogram showing the frequency of
occurrence of different values in ten unit increments. Each asterisk
represents ten occurrences of that value.
In addition to these data, the average time, burn, air miles, ground
miles, and ratio for all flights included in the analysis were printed.
The results were output for each comparison by airline (BLUE or RED), in
total and by region, and by direction.
4.3 COMPARISONS BY SEGMENT
For the comparisons by segment a similar, nearly identical, procedure was
used. The only difference was that it was required that the segment
"From Point", "To Point" ~and flight level match alongi with the date,
origin, destination, airline and flight number for the segment to be
included in the analysis. (Again, note that a weight match was still not
required.)
Since both computer systems feature the capability to perform a free
search of available routes, within a limited number of input constraints,
SPEAS
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Figure 4-3
SAMPLE OUTPUT
300
290
280
270
260
250
240
230
220
210
200
190
180
170
160
150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
+
+•
+
+
*
•f
*
*
*
*
+
*
***
***** * *
ilp irit'it'lt'Jc'itir'Jt'Je'Jt'Jtlt'Jcit'JC'ic'JF'Jr if
-20 -10 0 +10 +20
Mean ........ . 2.16 ...... -- -
Variance 34.61
Standard Deviation 5.88
90% Confidence Limits -7.52 to 11.84
Total Occurrences 384
Total Fuel Consumed -Hundreds
Operational Forecast Vs. Re-Analysis
Carrier: BLUE Direction: Eastbound Region: All
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it was to be expected that different routes would be selected even
when the weather conditions differed only slightly. As a result this
additional requirement that the from point and to point match when a plan
based on the forecast and a plan based on the actual were compared, large
numbers of segments were rejected from the analysis.
Results of the segment comparisons were printed in similar format by
airline, region and flight direction.
4.4 ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
Several additional analyses were conducted manually since it was decided
that the programming effort required to accomplish them automatically
was rather complex for a program that would be used only once. These
comparisons involved the North Atlantic Organized Track System, the fixed
routing between Amsterdam and Caracas, and the method these airlines used
in selecting which route was optimum on any given day.
Based upon a listing of summary information (date, flight, time, burn,
etc.) for each flight plan that was stored in the flight totals data
file, flight time and fuel burn from'plans based on the forecast and the
actual were plotted on a cross-sectional depiction of the NAT Tracks.
Figure 4-4 following is a sample of one of these charts. These data were
extracted and plotted for each day, eastbound and westbound, for BLUE and
for RED (when RED data were available for the same days as BLUE).
Similar plots were made for flight plans on nine fixed tracks between
SPEAS
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Amsterdam and Caracas. It was expected that these comparisons would
provide data on such things as the number of times the optimum routing on
the forecast proved to be the optimum on the actual.
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5. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
******************************
The computer output results of the Task I analyses have been provided to
NASA separately, in hard copy and on magnetic tape. They represent the
detailed findings of the analysis of all of the input data that were
provided.
These data cannot be reproduced in this report but they will be presented
in 'summary form and discussed in detail along with comments on the
practical significance of the findings. The following text describes the
findings of the flight totals comparisons, segment comparisons and the
special analyses of the NAT Tracks and the Amsterdam-Caracas tracks.
5.1 AIDS FLIGHTS ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS
In the first case reviewed, flight plans recreated from AIDS flights and
based on the operational forecast were compared with similar plans based
upon the verifying analysis. In the nomenclature introduced in Section 4
of this report, these are comparisons of Group 1 versus Group 3 plans.
It was expected that this comparison would show the potential savings in
fuel that would result if the verifying analysis were available at the
time flights are being planned, or in other words, if the 18-hour or
24-hour forecasts were always identical to the. subsequent NWS analyses
produced 18 or 24 hours later. Since all of the other flight planning
SPEAS
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parameters (route, flight level, etc.) are held constant, this comparison
measures the difference between the NWS forecast and the verifying
analysis, expressed in terms of fuel burn, flight time and air miles.
As mentioned earlier, there are differences in the data interpolation and
flight plan calculation algorithms between the BLUE and RED systems.
However, if one only compares BLUE data to other BLUE data and RED data
to other RED data, these differences are removed and the comparisons
truly represent a measure of the forecast accuracy.
All of the plans compared in this first case were recreated from actual
AIDS flights that operated on the corresponding dates in 1979. Thus, the
potential savings from improved forecasts are real and would not be
adjusted for such factors as ATC restrictions or other delays.
5.1.1 BLUE Data
Figure 5-1 summarizes the findings of the comparisons of BLUE flight
plans. A total of 222 flights were considered in the analysis of
eastbound operations. Of these 109 were in the North Atlantic region.
Since the differences were obtained by subtracting the Group 3 flight
plan value from the Group 1 flight plan value, positive values mean the
flight would require less fuel, less time, etc. on the verifying analysis
than it would on the forecast. Considering the westerly direction of the
prevailing wind, positive values also imply, in general, that the wind
P SPEAS
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Figure 5-1
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 1)
BLUE DATA
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 3) EASTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Occur-
rences
109
Africa
Polar
Mid Atlantic
Middle East
Pacific
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
11
15
43
Mean
569
3.1
00721
24.5
0
-291
-2.1
-.00755
-13.5
0
940
4.6
.00807
34.7
0
Vari-
ance
4607
13.3
.07204
814.1
0
3554
9.9
.26879
804.8
0
8197
14.6
.05433
1096.9
0
Std.
Dev.
679
3.7
.00849
28.5
0
596
3.1
.01639
28.4
0
905
3.8
.00737
33.1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
186
1,1
.0033
7.7
0
222
.8
.00256
8.4
0
2091
7.3
.07928
406.8
0
3862
7.3
.11736
727.4
0
457
2.7
.0089
20.2
0
621
2.7
.0108
27.0
0
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-548 to 1685
-3.0 to 9.1
-.00675 to .02117
-22.4 to 71.4
0
-1271 to 686
-7.2 to 3.0
-.0344 to .0193
-60.2 to 33.2
0
-549 to 2429
-1.7 to 10.9
-.00406 to .02019
-19.8 to 89.2
0
0
0
0
0
0
-563 to 938
-3.3 to 5.5 -•-
-.0113 to .0179
-25.5 to 40.9
0
-800 to 1244
-1.7 to 5.2
-.0156 to .0203
-36.0 to 52.8
0
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(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 3) EASTBOUND
Europe
United States
All Regions
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Occur-
rences
17
17
222
Mean
-141
-.9
-.00594
-6.5
0
82
.6
.0067
4
0
369
2.0
.00526
15.3
0
1167
6.7
.2063
238.6
0
3681
10.6
.0973
650.3
0
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-507 to 225
-3.8 to 1.9
-.02384 to .01196
-25.5 to 12.4
0
-481 to 645
-3.7 to 4.9
-.0169 to .0303
-21.3 to 29.3
0
-995 to 1364
-3.4 to 7.4
-.0110 to .0215
-26.6 to 57.2
0
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(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 3) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Caribbean
Far East
Africa
Middle East
Pacific
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd"Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Occur-
rences
143
4
5
21
76
3
Mean
-295
-1.2
-.0034
.-11.5
0
-75
-.3
-.00175
-3.5
0
-140
.4
-.0026
-4.4
0
52
-0.05
.00157
2.5
0
-114
-.6
-.00129
-3.6
0
267
1
.00433
10.3
0
Vari-
ance
11640
29.6
.15467
1862
0
319
1.2
.04819
55.3
0
944
1.0
.0624
165
0
5739
21.5
.425
1236.9
0
4452
14.1
.09998
766
0
8889
0
.00422
6.9
0
Std.
Dev.
1079
5.4
.01244
43.2
0
179
1.1
.00694
7.4
0
307
1.0
.00776
12.8
0
758
4.6
.02062
35.2
0
667
3.8
.01000
27.7
_ o
94
0
.00205
2.6
0
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-2070 to 1480
-10.1 to 7.8
-.02386 to .01706
-82.5 to 59.5
0
-369 to 219
-2.1 to 1.5
-.0132 to .00967
-15.7 to 8.7
0
-645 to 365
-1.2 to 2
-.0154 to .0102
-25.5 to 16.7
0
-1195 to 1299
-7.6 to 7.5
-.0323 to .0355
-55.4 to 60.4
0
-1211 to 983
-6.9 to 5.7
-.0177 to .0152
-49.2 to 42
0
112 to 422
1 to 1
.00096 to .0077
6.0 to 14.6
0
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(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 3) WESTBOUND
Europe
United States
Polar
All Regions
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Occur-
rences
24
6
23
305
Mean
54
-.2
.00092
1.4
0
-216
-1.8
-.01583
12.5
0
313
2.6
.003
13
0
-140
-.6
-.00184
-4.8
0
Vari-
ance
1075
4.1
.23583
222
0
1181
1.5
.36514
233.9
0
8481
21.6
.05678
1141.6
0
8072
20.8
.16429
1720
0
Std.
Dev.
328
2.0
.01536
14.9
0
344
1.2
.01912
15.3
0
921
4.7
.00754
33.8
0
898
4.6
.01282
41.5
0
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-540 to 594
-3.5 to 3.1
-.0243 to .0262
-23.1 to 25.9
0
-782 to 350
-3.8 to 0.2
-.0473 to .0156
-12.7 to 37.7
0
-1202 to 1828
-5.1 to 10.2
-.0094 to .0154
-42.5 to 68.6
0
-1617 to 1337
-8.2 to 7.0
-.0229 to .01925
-73.1 to 63.5
0
Source: BLUE Airlines Flight Plans and PRC Speas Analysis
CTC SPEAS
42.
speeds are underestimated. Stronger westerly winds appear on the
analysis than do on the forecast.
This was the case for most of the BLUE results. Negative burn and time
differences resulted only for the African area and for Europe. Most of
the African flights are more southbound than eastbound and the prevailing
westerly wind would not necessarily produce a positive difference, if in
fact one could consider the "prevailing wind" to be westerly in the
equatorial latitudes of Africa. Similarly, many of the European flights
were more southbound than eastbound, such as Frankfurt to Athens. This
could explain the negative differences for Europe. However, analysis of
individual flight plan segments showed persistent differences (almost
every day) between the forecast and actual in Eastern Europe and the
Middle East through Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Iraq and Iran, and it may
well be that there is some other explanation of poor forecast performance
in this region.
The overall result for all 222 eastbound flights was an average differ-
ence in fuel burn of 369 kg per flight. The potential time savings
averaged two minutes per flight.
For the 109 North Atlantic flights the potential savings were larger.
Average fuel burn difference per flight was 569 kg and the potential time
savings averaged 3.1 minutes per flight.
SPEAS
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For the westbound comparisons the results were largely consistent with
the eastbound findings. The analysis included 305 flights, of which 143
were on the North Atlantic. Time and fuel differences were mostly
negative, again indicating underestimated wind speeds. Africa and Europe
produced positive differences as expected. Ignoring the Pacific data
which included only three flights, only the polar region proved to be
inconsistent with the eastbound findings. For the 23 polar flights the
time and fuel differences were positive, although less than the eastbound
values (313 kg and 2.6 minutes vs. 940 kg and 4.6 minutes).
For all westbound flights the burn difference averaged -140 kg per flight
and the time difference averaged -0.6 minutes. On the North Atlantic the
burn difference averaged -295 kg and- the time difference averaged -1.2
minutes.
It is interesting to note that, although they are consistent in sign,
the eastbound and westbound results are not consistent in absolute value.
It would appear that greater savings are possible eastbound. Since
the objectives of this study are only to identify and comment on the
potential savings, a complete explanation of this apparent inconsistency
is beyond the scope of this study. However, it is speculated that the
lesser differences westbound may indicate that there is a gradient to
the forecast error with the magnitude of the error diminishing as it
progresses from the area of maximum winds to lighter winds. Thus,
eastbound flights which tend to seek the maximum winds are subject to
SPEAS
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larger forecast errors than westbound flights which tend to be in the
lighter wind regions north or south of the area of maximum winds. This
may also explain the positive values for westbound polar flights.
5.1.2 RED Data
Figure 5-2 summarizes the corresponding comparisons of the RED data.
There were 95 eastbound RED flights included in the analysis, of which 91
were on the North Atlantic. There were 147 westbound flights and 136 of
these were North Atlantic flights. The remainder of the RED data were
from polar flights.
Twelve RED flight plan comparisons for eastbound flights on November 5th
were removed from the original data base. All of the eastbound RED
flights for that day had differences of up to five to ten times the
standard deviation between the plan on the forecast and the plan on the
verifying analysis. Closer inspection of all individual flight plan
segments on the North Atlantic showed wind direction differences of 100
to 160 degrees and speed differences of 70 to 100 knots. It was decided
that differences this large were unlikely and that the RED data for that
day were somehow contaminated. By comparison only one North Atlantic
segment of all the BLUE plans for that day showed a wind direction and
speed difference of more than 30 degrees and ten knots on November 5th.
There were three other days for which there were both large differences
for RED Airlines and substantial disagreement between the RED and BLUE
!SPEAS
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Figure 5-2
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 1)
RED DATA
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 3) EASTBOUND
All Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
North Atlantic Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Polar Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 3) WESTBOUND
Occur-
rences
95
91
4
Mean
384
2.5
.00528
18.6
0
354
2.3
.00513
17.6
0.05
1078
6.3
.00875
42.3
-1.3
Vari-
ance
22674
26.4
.12585
1595.6
14.6
22396
26.5
.12935
1599.8
15.0
18180
.10.2
.03369
915.7
4.7
Std.
Dev.
1014
5.1
.01122
39.9
3.8
1008
5.2
.01137
40.00
3.9
908
3.2
'.00580
30.3
2.2
All Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
North Atlantic Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
147
136
Polar Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
11
-371
-1.3
-.00377
-14.1
-1.2
-385
-1.3
-.00394
-14.6
-1.4
-194
-1.1
-.00164
-8
.1
72973
75.8
.41480
5127.7
243.5
74562
77.0
.43517
5253.6
257.9
52585
61.5
.15805
3530
63.0
1819
8.7
.02037
71.6
15.6
1839
8.8
.02086
72.5
16.1
1544
7.8
.01257
59.4
7.9
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-1386 to 2154
-11.5 to 16.5
-.01431 to .02487
-51.1 to 88.3
-6.7 to 6.7
-1393 to 2129
-6.6 to 11.3
-.01458 to .02483
-51.8 to 86.9
-6.7 to 6.8
-756 to 2912
-0.2 to 12.7
-.00297 to .02047
-18.9 to 103.4
-5.6 to 3.1
-3364 to 2623
-15.6 to 13.1
.03727 to .02973
-131.9 to 103.7
-26.9 to 24.4
-3411 to 2641
-15.7 to 13.2
.03826 to .03037
-133.8 to 104.7
-27.8 to 25.1
-2735 to 2347
-14 to 11.8
.02232 to .01904
-105.7 to 89.7
-13.0 to 13.2
Source: RED Airlines Flight Plans and PRC Speas Analysis
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results. However, the differences were not so large and extensive as
to be clearly erroneous and they were left in the data base. These
discrepancies could be the result of data processing differences between
the BLUE and RED systems.
The RED results are comparable to and consistent with the BLUE data.
Average differences per flight for the 95 eastbound operations were 384
kg and 2.5 minutes. For the 147 westbound flights the differences were
-371 kg and -1.3 minutes. For the North Atlantic flights the eastbound
differences were 354 kg and 2.3 minutes and for westbound operations the
differences were -385 kg and -1.3 minutes. There were so few polar
flights that they should not be considered as a separate category.
Note in Figure 5-2 that slight differences in ground distances were
recorded for RED while the BLUE data always showed a'zero difference
in ground distance. This is a result of differences in the track
specification technique in the two systems. NASA's inputs to the BLUE
system specified the route in its entirety, even though a direct route
was assumed between the origin and the first ocean point. Therefore the
route was the same in the plans based on the forecast and the verifying
analysis. The RED system selects the minimum fuel routing in a free
search each time. So, even though the ocean points were specified and
identical for the forecast plan and the analysis plan, the airways
portion of the plan was the best route available on that weather data set
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and thus differed between the plan on the forecast and the plan on the
analysis.
5.2 MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON FORECAST AND THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS
Case two compared minimum time tracks (or minimum fuel tracks) based
on the operational forecast to minimum time tracks on the verifying
analysis. These were comparisons of Group 2 plans with Group 4 plans.
These comparisons were actually quite similar to those in the previous
case. It was essentially a test of the accuracy of the forecast but
using different types of routes. In Case 1, the AIDS routes represented
actual operational tracks which, for example, on the North Atlantic
were routes that were compatible with the NAT Tracks. Here, the MTTs
represent the ideal routing for fuel efficiency but are often routes
which cannot be followed entirely because of their incompatibility with
ATC operational requirements.
So, as in Case 1, it was expected that this comparison would show the
potential fuel savings that could result if the verifying analysis were
available at the time the forecast was issued. Here, however, the
resultant savings would be the sum of contributions from three factors.
The savings would be partly the result of the improved forecast, but the
remainder would be achieved partly from removal of the ATC restrictions
on the use of the MTT and partly from the ability to select a new MTT on
the verifying analysis.
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5.2.1 BLUE Data
For this analysis a total of 229 minimum time track comparisons were
included in the eastbound BLUE data. In the westbound analysis 231
comparisons were included. All are from the North Atlantic or Pacific
regions where MTT selection is possible. In other regions operations are
more or less restricted to airways and "MTT" selections are limited to a
choice among several fixed routings. The results of this analysis are
presented in Figure 5-3.
One westbound North Atlantic case and 11 eastbound cases were removed
from the original data base for this analysis because the plans on the
forecast weather were based on different flight levels from those on
which the plans on the verifying analysis were based. One could argue
that selection of a lower fuel consumption altitude profile is part of
the benefit of improved weather forecast data and that data from these
flights should be included in the results. However, since we cannot
be sure that the differing altitudes were not merely the result of
constraints imposed by the program algorithm and since we were trying to
isolate the affects of weather forecast data on fuel consumption, these
cases were not included.
As one might expect from the foregoing discussion the results of this
analysis are largely consistent in sign and magnitude with the Case 1
results. The potential fuel and time savings for the 229 eastbound
flights were 739 kg and 4.4 minutes. This is approximately twice the
SPEAS
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Figure 5-3
TASK I RESULTS
MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 2)
BLUE DATA
(GROUP 2 VS. GROUP 4) EASTBOUND
All Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
North Atlantic Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
Pacific Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
(GROUP 2 VS. GROUP 4) WESTBOUND
Occur-
rences
229
199
30
Mean
739
4.4
.00996
31.8
-4.1
815
4.8
.01087
34.8
-3.8
233
1.4
.0039
11.9
-5.5
Vari-
ance
5901
17.4
.12951
1002.8
943.9
5319
15.5
.12143
921.5
871.5
6829
19.6
.14089
1084.2
1421.1
Std.
Dev.
768
4.2
.01138
31.7
30.1
729
3.9
.01102
30.4
29.5
826
4.4
.01187
32.9
37.7
Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
231 -409
-2.0
-.00194
-17.2
-21.1
15543
40.3
.30611
2551.2
2484.8
1246
6.4
.0175
50.5
49.9
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-524 to 2002
-2.5 to 11.2
-.00876 to .02868
-20.3 to 83.9
-54.6 to 46.5
-381 to 2011
-1.7 to 11.3
-.00726 to .02894
-15.0 to 84.6
-52.4 to 44.7
-1122 to 1588
-5.9 to 8.7
-.01563 to .02337
-42.1 to 65.9
-67.5 to 56.6
-2459 to 1641
-12.5 to 8.4
.02685 to .03073
-100.3 to 65.9
-103.1 to 60.9
North Atlantic Burn 202 -322 13518 1163 -2235 to 1591
Time -1.7 37.8 6.2 -11.8 to 8.4
Ratio -.00348 .3205 .0179 -.02597 to .03293
Air Mi -14.3 2097.8 45.8 -89.6 to 61.1
Grnd Mi -24.2 2768.3 52.6 -110.7 to 62.4
Burn 29 -1017 25421 1594 -3639 to 1605
Time -4.3 51.9 7.2 -16.1 to 7.6
Ratio -.00879 .1812 .01346 -.03093 to .01335
Air Mi -37.7 3348.6 57.9 -132.9 to 57.5
Grnd M i 0 0 0 0
Source: BLUE Airlines Flight Plans and PRC Speas Analysis
Pacific
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savings noted for all regions in Case 1. For the 199 North Atlantic
operations the potential savings were 815 kg and 4.8 minutes.
Again, the positive differences eastbound indicate wind speeds were
underestimated in the forecast. The small negative differences in ground
distance also support this conclusion. MTT selection is a tradeoff
between air miles and ground miles. One is willing to go further away
from the great circle, or shortest distance route, if favorable winds on
that longer distance routing reduce the flight time or air miles. In
this.case, the negative ground distance differences imply that the route
selection program is less inclined to search further away from the great
circle in the underforecast or lighter winds. The stronger winds in the
actual weather data set allow searching further from the great circle
to utilize these beneficial winds at the expense of a larger ground
distance.
For the 231 westbound flights the average differences in burn and time
were -409 kg and -2.0 minutes. For the 202 North Atlantic operations the
differences were -322 kg and -1.7 minutes. These results were also
consistent with the previous findings. The differences were negative and
smaller than the eastbound differences.
The negative differences in ground distance were four to five times
larger than the eastbound differences. This is also consistent with
the previous comment on ground distance. In the westbound case the
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track selection process tends to consider routings further from the
underestimated maximum winds and thus, on the average, further from
the great circle. When these selections are rerun on the verifying
analysis the stronger winds force the selection still further from
the great circle and result in the larger negative ground distance
differences.
The results for the Pacific region merit some comment and explanation.
For the 29 westbound flights on the Pacific the average burn difference
was -1,017 kg and the time difference was -4.3 minutes. At first it
would appear unusual that the differences on the Pacific are considerably
larger. However, all of the Pacific flights considered were Seattle
to Tokyo operations and the zero ground distance difference implies
that the same track was used for the plans on the forecast and the
analysis. Airspace restrictions (over USSR airspace) and the related ATC
restrictions (the preferred routing from Anchorage to Tokyo) limit the
free search of the MTT selection program. Routings further north,
over Siberia would usually be selected. However, the plans on the
underestimated winds and the plans on the stronger actual winds could not
go further north and, thus, the stronger winds resulted in larger burn
differences.
5.2.2. RED Data
In the RED data there were 29 cases in each direction after the November
5th data were removed. These results are presented in Figure 5-4. All
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Figure 5-4
TASK I RESULTS
MINIMUM FUEL TRACKS'ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 2)
RED DATA
(GROUP 2 VS. GROUP 4) EASTBOUND
All Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Occur-
rences
29
Mean
475
3.5
.00993
24.3
-6.6
9849
13.8
.12317
816
542.4
668
3.7
.0111
28.6
23.3
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-883 to 1593
-2.8 to 9.7
-.00864 to .0285
-23.5 to 72.1
-45.5 to 32.4
GROUP 2 VS. GROUP 4) WESTBOUND
All Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
29 -324 5850 1135 -1868 to 1220
-1 32.5 5.7 -10.4 to 8.4
-.00186 .45377 .0213 -.03318 to .0369
-12.3 2059.5 45.4 -87.0 to 62.4
-17.1 1341.6 36.6 -77.4 to 43.1
Source: RED Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
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of the minimum time tracks (or minimum fuel tracks, in this case) were
from North Atlantic flights.
Eastbound the average differences were 475 kg of fuel and 3.5 minutes.
Westbound the burn difference was -324 kg and the time difference was
-1 minute. Again, these findings are completely consistent with the
previous data and the same comments apply. The eastbound differences are
positive, the westbound differences are negative and smaller, and the
ground distance differences are negative but larger in the westbound
case.
5.3 AIDS FLIGHTS AND MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON FORECAST WEATHER
The third case analyzed, compared AIDS recreated flight plans on the
forecast weather to minimum time tracks on the forecast, or Group 1 plans
with Group 2 plans.
Since both plans in this case are based on the forecast, the comparison
does not show directly the potential fuel savings that can be achieved
through improved forecasts. Instead, this comparison was designed to
show the savings that could be achieved, even with current forecast
capability, if carriers were able to fly the optimum route or minimum
time track and were not restricted by ATC operational constraints.
Indirectly this was a test of the potential benefit from improved
forecasting capability in that, were the forecasts available on a timely
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basis, weather considerations could be more effectively integrated into
the process of defining the ATC constraints.
As was mentioned in Section 3, several inherent features of the BLUE
system and the input procedures somewhat corrupted the results. While
the RED data did not suffer from any such problems, there were so
few RED cases that the RED data on their own could not be considered
statistically reliable.
5.3.1 BLUE Data
Comparisons were made for 36 eastbound BLUE cases and 49 westbound
flights, all on the North Atlantic. The findings are summarized in
Figure 5-5.
The potential savings, eastbound, were 511 kg and -6.4 minutes. West-
bound the savings were 1,978 kg and -7.4 minutes. However, these results
must be adjusted for the effect of two factors - differing ground
distances and differing flight levels.
The routings used for the AIDS recreated flight plans were only specified
in detail for the over-ocean portion of the route. Direct routings were
assumed for the segment between the origin and the first ocean checkpoint
and the segment between the last ocean point and the destination. The
minimum time track routing was restricted to usable airways routings for
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Figure 5-5
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS AND MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON FORECAST WEATHER (CASE 3)
BLUE DATA
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 2) EASTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Occur-
rence^
36
Mean
511
-6.4
.00025
-35.0
-38.9
32504
53.3
.00672
3092.3
2579.9
1803
7.3
.04513
55.6
50.8
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-2455 to 3477
-18.4 to 5.6
-.0108 to .0113
-126.5 to 56.5
-122.4 to 44.7
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 2) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
49 1978 55846 2363 -1909 to 5865
-7.4 63.3 8.0 -20.5 to 5.7
-.00176 .37014 .01924 -.03341 to .02989
-45.6 3140.8 56.0 -137.8 to 46.6
-39 6125.5 78.3 -167.8 to 39.3
Source: BLUE Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
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these segments. This resulted in a distance bias favoring the AIDS
recreated flight.
This discrepancy is further evident from the negative differences in both
ground distance and air distance. From the discussion in Section 5.2.1
regarding MTT selection as a tradeoff between ground miles and air miles,
it is apparent that one is willing to incur increasing penalties in
ground miles in order to reduce air miles. The results of Figure 5-5,
however, show that these AIDS flights incurred penalties both in air
miles and ground miles.
Since the additional ground distance is added to the MTT, the result
would be to increase the fuel savings were we able to quantify the ground
distance error. To do so, the detailed segment by segment flight plan
distances were compared for each of the routings that were used by the 36
eastbound and 49 westbound flights. Eastbound the average differences in
ground distance between the airways routes and the direct routes actually
used ranged from 3 nm for Montreal-Copenhagen flights to 114 nm for
Houston-Amsterdam flights. Westbound the differences ranged from 4 nm
between Copenhagen and Chicago to 70 nm between Amsterdam and Houston.
The weighted average distance bias for all eastbound flights was 53 nm
and for westbound flights it was 32.8 nm. Since most of the distance
error occurred on the North American side where the overland routings are
longer, it was decided that a correction factor based on the fuel flow
for a heavier aircraft (early in its flight) would be used eastbound,
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and one based on a lighter aircraft (near the end of its flight) would
be used westbound. Based on the actual fuel flows for the first one-
third and last one-third of the flight, correction factors of 18 kg/nm
(westbound) and 21 kg/nm (eastbound) were chosen. Applying these to the
distance errors would add 1113 kg (53 nm x 21 kg/nm) eastbound, and 590
kg (32.8 nm x kg/nm) westbound to the estimated fuel savings presented in
Figure 5-5.
A second modification of these results is suggested by differences in the
planned flight levels for each group. NASA attempted to recreate the
AIDS flights as closely as possible and restricted the flight plan
altitudes to those used on the original flight. The minimum time track
plans, however, were calculated at optimum flight levels. As a result,
only two of the 36 eastbound cases and seven of the 49 westbound cases
were at reasonably similar if not identical flight levels. For all
others the MTT plan was at higher levels for some part of the flight.
Since one would normally use optimum flight levels on the MTT, if he
could, this flight level discrepancy does not negate the conclusion.
It's still correct to say that the 1,343 kg to 2,962 kg of fuel could
have been saved had these AIDS flights flown the MTT at optimum altitude.
However, some portion of the savings is the result of removal of restric-
tions on the use of the optimum altitudes and these savings would
presumably be achieved even on the AIDS route if optimum altitudes
were used.
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The negative time differences in Figure 5-5 are another indication of
the magnitude of the affect these flight level differences had on the
result. If comparable flight levels were used (and the ground distance
discrepancy were not present) it would be highly unlikely that a positive
fuel burn difference and a negative time difference would result.
It was determined through analysis of the detailed flight plans that on
the average the flight level differences occurred for the following
percentages of the flight distance:
Eastbound Westbound
Same Flight Level 55% 34%
MTT 2000 Ft. Higher 8% 20%
MTT 4000 Ft. Higher 30% 33%
MTT 6000 Ft. Higher or More 7% 13%
Based upon the fuel mileage performance for a B747-200B, at long range
cruise, and at standard temperature approximate fuel burn differences
per nautical jnile were determined between the optimum flight level and
flight levels 2000, 4000 and 6000 ft. below optimum for the typical BLUE
Airlines flight which had a landing weight of 204,000 kg and a takeoff
weight of 280,000 kg (eastbound) to 293,000 kg (westbound). The weighted
average difference in burn due to the flight level differences was found
to be 0.3155 kg/nm westbound and 0.149 kg/nm eastbound. After applying
this to the average eastbound flight of 3780 nm and the average westbound
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flight of 3712 nm it was estimated that 563 kg of the potential savings,
eastbound, and 1171 kg of the potential savings, westbound, were the
result of the flight level differences rather than routing or weather
data.
In summary, one can estimate that the potential fuel savings in Case 3
could be as high as 1061 kg to 1397 kg after adjustments are applied as
follows:
Eastbound Westbound
Fuel Savings (From Figure 5-5) 511 kg 1978 kg
Estimated Effect of Distance Bias +1113 kg 590 kg
Estimated Effect of Flight Level Differences -563 kg 1171 kg
Net Potential Savings 1061 kg 1397 kg
»
5.3.2 RED Data
Results for the RED data are presented in Figure 5-6. After the erro-
neous data for November 5th were removed, there were seven eastbound
cases and 10 westbound.
The average savings, eastbound, were 1,892 kg and 2.9 minutes, and
for westbound operations, 1,760 kg and 1.7 minutes. In this case the
distances and flight levels were comparable and, except for the effect of
the small sample size, these results are representative of the potential
savings.
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Figure 5-6
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS AND MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON FORECAST WEATHER (CASE 3)
RED DATA
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 2) EASTBOUND
Occur-
rences
North Atlantic Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Mean
1892
2.9
.014
42.9
-.6
42828
27.8
.16943
1879
243.1
1394
5.3
.01302
43.4
15.6
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-400.6 to 4186
-5.8 to 11.5
-.00741 to .03541
-28.5 to 114.2
-26.2 to 25.1
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 2) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn 10
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
1760 41142 1366 -487 to 4008
1.7 6.6 2.6 -2.5 to 5.9
.00710 .12249 .01107 -.01111 to .02531
24.6 179.8 13.4 2.5 to 46.7
3.4 1532.6 39.2 -6.1 to 67.8
Source: RED Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
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5.4 AIDS FLIGHTS AND MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS
The fourth case analyzed compared AIDS recreated flights on the verifying
analysis to minimum time tracks on the same weather data. These were
Group 3 plans compared to Group 4 plans.
This case is essentially the same as Case 3 except for the weather data
used. It is still a comparison of flights on actual operational routes
with flights on the optimum route for that weather data set. The weather
data is the same for both flight plans but this time it is the verifying
analysis rather than the forecast. In fact, if one were to think of the
weather data as a "black box" regardless of whether it is forecast or
analysis, the conditions for this comparison are identical to those in
Case 3 except that a different "black box" has been substituted for the
weather.
As such, Case 4 is another measure of the potential savings which could
be achieved if carriers could fly the MTT at optimum flight levels.
Unfortunately, the same conditions regarding ground distance and flight
l.eve.l. differences existed here and these results are also somewhat
misleading. Only three of the eastbound and five of the westbound BLUE
Airlines flights had comparable flight levels.
5.4.1 BLUE Data
Thirty-five eastbound and 48 westbound North Atlantic BLUE flights were
included in the Case 4 comparison. These findings are presented in
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Figure 5-7 and, as would be expected, they are comparable in sign
and magnitude to the Case 3 results. Burn differences are positive
indicating a potential fuel savings, and time, air distance, and ground
distance differences are negative, indicating discrepancies in the ground
distances and flight levels.
For the 35 eastbound flights the potential fuel savings were 666 kg and
the time difference was -6.5 minutes. For the 48 westbound flights the
burn and time differences were 2,096 kg and -7.5 minutes.
Following the same methodology as in Case 3, the effect of the ground
distance and flight level differences can be estimated. Since the same
city pairs are involved, it can be assumed that the bias introduced
because of the distance and flight level differences is the same, on the
average, even though the routes and flight levels for individual flights
may differ.
Therefore, as in the previous case, we must conclude that the potential
-fuel--savings..presented in Figu_re__5_-7 should be adjusted as follows:
Eastbound Westbound
Fuel Savings (From Figure 5-7) 666 kg 2096 kg
Estimated Effect of Distance Bias +1113 kg 590 kg
Estimated Effect of Flight Level Differences -563 kg 1171 kg
Net Potential Savings 1216 kg 1515 kg
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Figure 5-7
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS AND MINIMUM TIME TRACKS ON THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 4)
BLUE DATA
(GROUP 3 VS. GROUP 4) EASTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Occur-
rences
35
Mean
666
-6.5
.00388
-30.8
-48.1
30067
48.5
.13042
2636.2
2604.1
1734
7.0
.01142
51.3
51.0
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-2172 to 3532
-18 to 5
-.01524 to .02233
-114.8 to 54.1
-133.7 to 34.2
(GROUP 3 VS. GROUP 4) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn 48
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
2096 61579 2482 -1986 to 6178
-7.5 99.3 10.0 -23.9 to 8.9
.00538 1.10811 .03329 -.04938 to .06014
-43.5 5490.7 74.1 -165.4 to 78.4
-61.2 9137.7 95.6 -218.4 to 96.1
Source: BLUE Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
SPEAS
64.
5.4.2 RED Data
The corresponding RED results for Case 4 are presented in Figure 5-8.
Again, the data for the eastbound flight of November 5th have been
removed to be consistent with the previous comparisons.
The average burn and time differences for the seven eastbound flights
were 1,931 kg and three minutes. For the ten westbound flights the
differences were 1,937 kg and 2.8 minutes. These results are quite
similar to the RED results in the previous case, as one would expect
since only the weather data set differed between the two.
5.5 AIDS FLIGHTS ON FORECAST WEATHER AND MTTs ON THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS
The fifth case compared AIDS recreated flights on the forecast weather to
minimum time tracks on the verifying analysis, or Group 1 plans to Group
4 plans.
In effect this case combines the conditions of the two previous cases.
It was expected that it would show the combined savings that could be
achieved 'from an improved forecast and from being permitted to fly the
MTT at optimum flight levels. As such, it represents the maximum savings
that could be achieved as measured by the current NWS analysis and
forecast models. It compared flights as they are typically operated in
the real world today with flights as they might be operated under ideal
conditions.
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Figure 5-8
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS AND MINIMUM FUEL TRACKS ON THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 4)
RED DATA
(GROUP 3 VS. GROUP 4) EASTBOUND
Occur-
rences
North Atlantic Burn (kg) 7
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Mean
1931
3
.01729
42.4
-11.6
40405
16.3
.07020
1083.4
229.1
1354
4.0
.00838
32.9
15.1
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-296 to 4159
-3.6 to 9.6
.0035 to .03107
-11.7 to 96.6
-36.5 to 13.3
(GROUP 3 VS. GROUP 4) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn 10
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
1937 55073 1581 -663 to 4538
2.8 16.2 4.0 . -3.8 to 9.4
.0156 .63924 .02528 -.02599 to .05719
34 794.4 28.2 -12.4 to 80.4
-12.8 3494.2 59.1 -110.0 to 84.4
Source: RED Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
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Since this comparison was between AIDS flights and MTTs it was also
subject to the discrepancies introduced due to the direct routings and
the flight level differences. Only four of the eastbound and seven of
the westbound BLUE flights were at comparable flight levels.
5.5.1 BLUE Data
Thirty-six eastbound and 49 westbound flights were included in the
BLUE data for Case 5. The results of the analysis are presented in
Figure 5-9. For the eastbound flights the average fuel savings were 1311
kg and the time difference averaged -2.6 minutes. For the westbound
flights the average fuel savings were 1594 kg and the time difference was
-9.0 minutes.
As in the previous cases, the effect of the direct distances and flight
level differences was added.
Eastbound Westbound
Fuel Savings (From Figure 5-9) 1311 kg 1594 kg
Estimated Effect of Distance Bias +1113 kg 590 kg
Estimated Effect of Flight Level Differences -563 kg . -1171 kg
Net Potential Savings 1861 kg 1013 kg
It follows from the discussion above that the potential savings achieved
should be greater in Case 5 than in any of the previous cases reviewed.
Based on the adjusted figures the eastbound difference or potential
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Figure 5-9
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS ON FORECAST WEATHER AND MTTS ON THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 5)
BLUE DATA
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 4) EASTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Occur-
rence^
36
Mean
1311
-2.6
.01183
-2.0
-51.2
37382
72.3
.21714
3958.5
2533.2
1933
8.5
.01474
62.9
50.3
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
-1861 to 4500
-16.4 to 11.6
-.01274 to .03574
-105.3 to 101.7
-132.7 to 32.9
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 4) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn 49
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
1594 60316 2456 -2446 to 5634
-9.0 102.8 10.1 -25.7 to 7.6
.00206 .82296 .02869 -.04513 to .04925
-60.1 5754.3 75.9 -185.3 to 64.3
-65.9 9404.8 97.0 -225.4 to 93.7
Source: BLUE Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
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fuel savings of 1861 kg are the highest of any of the cases reviewed.
However, for the westbound flights the savings of 1013 kg are less than
the westbound savings in the two previous cases.
5.5.2 RED Data
In Case 5 there were six eastbound and 10 westbound flights included
in the RED data. Findings are summarized in Figure 5-10. As in the
previous comparisons the suspected erroneous data for a flight on
November 5th were removed before the statistics in Figure 5-10 were
calculated.
The average savings in burn and time for the six eastbound flights were
1,989 kg and 6.8 minutes. The differences for the ten westbound flights
were 1,220 kg. Again these potential savings are lower than those found
for RED in the previous cases. However, this is probably the result of
the statistical unreliability of the very small number of flights in the
sample rather than an indication that no additional savings could be
achieved through improved forecasts.
5.6 COMPARISONS BY SEGMENTS
Comparisons similar to those described for flight totals were made for
individual flight plan segments. As mentioned in Section 4.3 dissimilar
routes and flight levels resulted in vast numbers of segments being
rejected from the analysis. As a result the segment results were not
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Figure 5-10
TASK I RESULTS
AIDS FLIGHTS ON FORECAST WEATHER AND MFT'S ON THE VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 5)
RED DATA
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 4) EASTBOUND
Occur-
rences
North Atlantic Burn (kg)
Time (mins)
Ratio
Air Mi (nm)
Grnd Mi (nm)
Mean
1989
6.8
.02467
66.7
-10.2
29029
33.1
.10856
1894.6
293.8
1148
5.8
.01042
43.5
17.1
90 Percent
Confidence Limits
100 to 3877
-2.7 to 16.3
.00753 to .04181
-5.0 to 138.3
-38.4 to 18.0
(GROUP 1 VS. GROUP 4) WESTBOUND
North Atlantic Burn 10
Time
Ratio
Air Mi
Grnd Mi
1220 79115 1895 -1896 to 4337
-1.1 52.9 7.3 -13.1 to 10.9
.0049 .77089 .02776 -.04077 to .05057
.6 3150.4 56.1 -91.7 to 92.9
-13.7 "3488.6 -59.1 -110.9 to 83.5
Source: RED Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
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deemed to be meaningful and no attempt was made to adjust the computer
findings to correct for any anomolies in the data.
Since all conditions were similar, the findings for segment data should
have been consistent with the findings for the flight totals. The flight
totals are merely the sum of the segments.
In Case 1, for example, the average ground distance for all eastbound
BLUE flights was 2,545 nm. For the corresponding segment data the
average distance was 213 nm. Therefore, on the average, there were 11.9
segments per flight and the average burn difference per segment of 14 kg
times 11.9 segments should agree with the Case 1 difference for the
flight totals of 569 kg. Of course it does not agree exactly but in
terms of sign and order of magnitude the segment totals for this case,
and for all the others, are generally in agreement with the flight
total comparisons.
Where they do not agree, it is apparent that the segment data either
consist of very small samples or the corrections for data anomalies have
not been applied.
Summaries of the segment data appear in Figures 5-11 through 5-13.
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Figure 5-11
TASK I RESULTS BY SEGMENT
AIDS RECREATED FLIGHTS ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 1)
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Source: RED and BLUE Airlines Flight Plans and PRC Speas Analysis
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Figure 5-12
TASK I RESULTS BY SEGMENT
MINIMUM TIME/MINIMUM FUEL TRACKS ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING ANALYSIS (CASE 2)
North Atlantic
AVERAGE DISTANCE
BLUE EASTBOUND
All Regions
North Atlantic
BLUE WESTBOUND
All Regions
North Atlantic
RED EASTBOUND
UUV.UI -
rences
1896
1748
1823
1493
nvy . uur n
Oiff. (kg)
93
97
-2
20
w U U •
Dev.
363
375
918
1005
Air Mi.
167
156
222
197
Grnd. Mi.
187
174
207 '
187
210 74 747 160 179
RED WESTBOUND
North Atlantic 176 -7 160 171 157
Source: BLUE and RED Airlines Flight Plans
PRC Speas Analysis
SPEAS
i Figure 5-13
;
 TASK I RESULTS BY SEGMENT
:- AIDS RECREATED FLIGHTS AND MTT/MFT ON FORECAST AND VERIFYING /
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CASE 3 - AIDS AND MTT ON FORECAST
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CASE 4 - AIDS AND MTT ON ANALYSIS
BLUE Eastbound
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CASE 5 - AIDS ON FORECAST AND MTT ON VERIFYING ANALYSIS
BLUE Eastbound
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BLUE Westbound
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RED Westbound
North Atlantic 14 -32 72 128
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5.7 NORTH ATLANTIC ORGANIZED TRACKS
BLUE flight plans were run on each NAT Track at each available flight
level from 290 to 370 for the 30 days for which data were collected.
These plans were run both on the forecast and on the verifying analysis.
Corresponding data were available from RED for eight of the "eastbound
days" and 16 of the "westbound days".
In routine daily operations it is not practical for an airline to compute
a flight plan for every NAT Track at every available level to determine
the least fuel route and profile to use on that day. Therefore, track
selection systems were developed that would search for the approximate
least fuel track, so that a small number of plans could be run to
determine the best route. .Each system uses some assumptions to shorten
the search and, although computer track selection has been in use for
nearly 20 years, there is still wide disagreement on which method is best
and which assumptions introduce the least error.
Among others, there are three track selection assumptions inherent in
airline flight planning systems which could be tested in this analysis.
The first assumption is that the minimum fuel track and the minimum time
track are identical. Airline systems following this assumption select an
MTT in a preliminary analysis and then expect that the minimum fuel plan
is a vertical optimization on that track.
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A second assumption used by some airlines is that there is no significant
track selection difference in the vertical, or in other words, the
minimum time route selected at FL330 would also be the minimum time route
at FL290 or FL390.
A third widespread belief, although it is not incorporated directly into
flight planning algorithms, is that synoptic scale systems change slowly
enough so that the choice of the best NAT Track does not change between
forecast and actual even though the time and fuel burn might change. For
example, if Track C is selected as the best on the forecast it will
continue to be best through the verification time.
Each of these three theories was tested in this analysis.
The first case considered, which attempted to determine whether the
minimum time NAT Track and minimum fuel NAT Track were the same, could be
analyzed both on the forecast weather and on the verifying analysis.
For BLUE JFK-AMS and AMS-JFK track comparisons on the forecast weather
data, the minimum time NAT track was coincident with the minimum fuel
track 36 out of a possible 60 times (one eastbound and one westbound case
on each of 30 days). The minimum fuel track was on the track adjacent to
the minimum time track 20 times and on the remaining four occasions it
was displaced by two tracks, which could be 120 or 240 nautical miles
away depending on whether or not composite tracks were in use.
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On the verifying analysis, the tracks were coincident 27 times. The
minimum fuel track was adjacent to the minimum time track 28 times and
was displaced by two tracks on the remaining five occasions.
With the RED data the findings were similar. Comparisons of the track
selection were made for 16 westbound days and eight eastbound days. On
the forecast weather the minimum time track was coincident with the
minimum fuel track 13 times and on the adjacent track 11 times. Once,
the minimum time and minimum fuel tracks were displaced by five tracks
with the MTT being Track D and the MFT being Track H. On the verifying
analysis, the findings were almost identical with 13 on the same track,
11 on the adjacent track and one day on which the MTT and MFT were
separated by two tracks.
Based on these data it is clear that airlines that use minimum time as
the basis for their track selection algorithm are not selecting the best
fuel track nearly 50 percent of the time.
To test the second hypothesis, the minimum time NAT track selected by the
BLUE system at FL330 eastbound and FL350 westbound were compared to the
minimum fuel track which was invariably at one of the higher flight
levels available in the system. Minimum time tracks from the forecast
were compared to minimum fuel tracks on the analysis. For 32 of the 60
cases the NAT minimum time track selected at FL330 or FL350 was also the
minimum fuel track. For 20 flights the MFT was the track adjacent to
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the MTT and the average burn penalty for being on the wrong track was 205
kg. (This was determined by subtracting the burn on the MFT flight plan
from the burn on the plan that was based on the MTT at optimum flight
levels.) The MFT was displaced two NAT tracks from the MTT on three days
with an average burn penalty of 367 kg. On four days the displacement
was three tracks with a penalty of 308 kg and for the one remaining case
the displacement was four tracks with a penalty of 500 kg.
On the average, therefore, a penalty of 248 kg of fuel results each time
the wrong track is selected and, considering all cases, an average
penalty per flight of 116 kg results from basing the track selection on
minimum time at a single flight level.
The third question was addressed by comparing the minimum fuel track on
the forecast to the minimum fuel track on the verifying analysis. For 41
of the 60 BLUE flights both MFTs were on the same NAT track. Even
though the earlier findings from Case 2 in Section 5.2 showed that North
Atlantic flight plans on the verifying analysis differed by 409 kg to 815
kg from those on the forecast, the findings discussed here verify that 68
percent of the time the same track would be selected on either weather
data set. In these cases, selection of the track on the forecast did not
contribute to the fuel burn penalty that resulted from the inaccuracy of
the forecast.
SPEAS
78.
For the remaining 19 flights the MFT on the verifying analysis was on the
track adjacent to the MFT on the forecast six times and was displaced by
2, 3, or 4 NAT tracks 13 times. The average fuel burn penalty for these
19 flights was 353 kg. Since this difference was determined from both
plans on the analysis, rather than between the forecast and the analysis,
this penalty may be considered to be in addition to the penalty resulting
from the forecast inaccuracy. In other words, combining the data from
Case 2 and these data implies that for 32 percent of North Atlantic
flights a penalty of up to 815 kg of fuel results because of forecast
inaccuracy and an additional penalty of 353 kg is incurred because
the wrong track was chosen in the first place.
5.8 AMSTERDAM-CARACAS ROUTES
At the time these data were gathered it was the practice of at least
one airline, and possibly more, to operate on a single fixed route
between Europe and points in the Caribbean or the northern coast of South
America. This was partly due to ATC considerations and partly due to the
belief that a flight in the generally north-south direction, partly in
southern latitudes, would not benefit much from an optimized track
selection.
NASA arbitrarily laid out eight additional tracks some on each side of
the fixed route, which was commonly referred to as "Red 99". Amsterdam-
Caracas and Caracas-Amsterdam flight plans were run on the verifying
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analysis at all levels on each of these nine routes for each of the 30
days for which data were gathered.
Figure 5-14 shows the number of times each track was selected. Even
without knowing which track was "Red 99", it is clear from the distribu-
tion of the choices that continuing to use a single fixed route between
these cities is not wise. It turns out that track number 6 is the "Red
99" route and it was the best fuel choice only six times out of the 60
cases considered. The average burn and flight time differences between
Track 6 and the actual best fuel route for each day were computed. These
differences were 7.2 minutes and 1230 kg for the eastbound flights and
4.5 minutes and 877 kg for the westbound flights.
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FIGURE 5-14
AMSTERDAM-CARACAS ROUTE SELECTION
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